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Sharpen Your Knowledge with CFA Institute (CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst) Certification Sample Questions
CertsTime has provided you with a sample question set to elevate your knowledge about the CFA Institute CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst exam. With these updated sample questions, you can become quite familiar with the difficulty level and format of the real CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst certification test. Try our sample CFA Institute CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst certification practice exam to get a feel for the real exam environment. Our sample practice exam gives you a sense of reality and an idea of the questions on the actual CFA Institute CFA Level II certification exam.
Our sample questions are similar to the Real CFA Institute CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst exam questions. The premium CFA Institute CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst certification practice exam gives you a golden opportunity to evaluate and strengthen your preparation with real-time scenario-based questions. Plus, by practicing real-time scenario-based questions, you will run into a variety of challenges that will push you to enhance your knowledge and skills.
CFA Institute CFA Level II Chartered Financial Analyst Sample Questions:
William Bow, CFA, is a risk manager for GlobeCorp, an international conglomerate with operations in the technology, consumer products, and medical devices industries. Exactly one year ago, GlobeCorp, under Bow's advice, entered into a 3-year payer interest rate swap with semiannual floating rate payments based on the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and semiannual fixed rate payments based on an annual rate of 2.75%. At the time of initiation, the swap had a value of zero and the notional principal was set equal to $150 million. The counterparty to GlobeCorp's swap is NVS Bank, a commercial bank that also serves as a swap dealer. Exhibit 1 below summarizes the current LIBOR term structure.
Upper management at GlobeCorp feels that the original swap has served its intended purpose but that circumstances have changed and it is now time to offset the firm's exposure to the swap. Because they cannot find a counterparty to an offsetting swap transaction, management has asked Bow to come up with alternative measures to offset the swap exposure. Bow created a report for the management team which outlines several strategies to neutralize the swap exposure. Two of his strategies are included in Exhibit 2.
After examining its long-term liabilities, NVS Bank has decided that it currently needs to borrow $100 million over the next two years to finance its operations. For this type of funding need, NVS generally issues quarterly coupon short-term floating rate notes based on 90-day LIBOR. NVS is concerned, however, that interest rates may shift upward and the LIBOR curve may become upward sloping. To manage this risk, NVS is considering utilizing interest rate derivatives. Managers at the bank have collected quotes on over-the-counter interest rate caps and floors from a well known securities dealer. The quotes, which are based on a notional principal of $100 million, are provided in Exhibit 3.
One of the managers at NVS Bank, Lois Green, has expressed her distrust of the securities dealer quoting prices on the caps and floors. In a memo to the CFO, Green suggested that NVS use an alternative but equivalent approach to manage the interest rate risk associated with its two-year funding plan. Following is an excerpt from Green's memo:
"Rather than using a cap or floor, NVS Bank can effectively manage its exposure to interest rates resulting from the 2-year funding requirement by taking long positions in a series of put options on fixed-income instruments with expiration dates that coincide with the payment dates on the floating rate note."
"As a cheaper alternative, NVS can effectively manage its exposure to interest rates resulting from the 2-ycar funding requirement by creating a collar using long positions in a series of call options on interest rates and long positions in a series of call options on fixed income instruments all of which would have expiration dates that coincide with the payment dates on the floating rate note."
Which of the following statements regarding the GlobeCorp swap initiated one year ago is most likely correct?
Rock Torrey, an analyst for International Retailers Incorporated (IRI), has been asked to evaluate the firm's swap transactions in general, as well as a 2-year fixed for fixed currency swap involving the U .S . dollar and the Mexican peso in particular. The dollar is Torrey's domestic currency, and the exchange rate as of June 1,2009, was $0.0893 per peso. The swap calls for annual payments and exchange of notional principal at the beginning and end of the swap term and has a notional principal of $100 million. The counterparty to the swap is GHS Bank, a large full-service bank in Mexico.
The current term structure of interest rates for both countries is given in the following table:
Torrey believes the swap will help his firm effectively mitigate its foreign currency exposure in Mexico, which sterns mainly from shopping centers in high-end resorts located along the eastern coastline. Having made this conclusion, Torrey begins writing his report for the management of IRI. In addition to the terms of the swap, Torrey includes the following information in the report:
* Implicit in the currency swap under consideration is a swap spread of 75 basis points over 2-year U .S . Treasury securities. This represents a 10 basis point narrowing of the spread as compared to this time last year. Thus, we can assume that the credit risk of the global credit market has decreased. Unfortunately, the decline provides no insight into the credit risk of the individual currency swap with GHS Bank, which could have increased.
* In order to decrease the counterparty default risk on the currency swap, we will need to utilize credit derivatives between the beginning and midpoint of the swap's life when this particular risk is at its highest. This is a significantly different strategy than we normally use with interest rate swaps. For interest rate swaps, counterparty default risk peaks at the middle of the swap's life, at which point we utilize credit derivative CQuntermeasures to offset the risk.
* Because currency swaps almost always include netting agreements and interest rate swaps can be structured to include mark-to-market agreements, we can significantly reduce the credit risk of these swap instruments by negotiating swap contracts that include these respective features. When negotiating these features is not possible, credit risk can be reduced by using off-market swaps that do not require an initial payment from IRI.
Six months have passed (180 days) since Torrey issued his report to IRI's management team, and the current exchange rate is now $0,085 per peso. The new term structure of interest rates is as follows:
Calculate the value of the 2-year currency swap from the perspective of the counterparty paying dollars six months after Torrey's initial analysis.
Rock Torrey, an analyst for International Retailers Incorporated (IRI), has been asked to evaluate the firm's swap transactions in general, as well as a 2-year fixed for fixed currency swap involving the U .S . dollar and the Mexican peso in particular. The dollar is Torrey's domestic currency, and the exchange rate as of June 1,2009, was $0.0893 per peso. The swap calls for annual payments and exchange of notional principal at the beginning and end of the swap term and has a notional principal of $100 million. The counterparty to the swap is GHS Bank, a large full-service bank in Mexico.
The current term structure of interest rates for both countries is given in the following table:
Torrey believes the swap will help his firm effectively mitigate its foreign currency exposure in Mexico, which sterns mainly from shopping centers in high-end resorts located along the eastern coastline. Having made this conclusion, Torrey begins writing his report for the management of IRI. In addition to the terms of the swap, Torrey includes the following information in the report:
* Implicit in the currency swap under consideration is a swap spread of 75 basis points over 2-year U .S . Treasury securities. This represents a 10 basis point narrowing of the spread as compared to this time last year. Thus, we can assume that the credit risk of the global credit market has decreased. Unfortunately, the decline provides no insight into the credit risk of the individual currency swap with GHS Bank, which could have increased.
* In order to decrease the counterparty default risk on the currency swap, we will need to utilize credit derivatives between the beginning and midpoint of the swap's life when this particular risk is at its highest. This is a significantly different strategy than we normally use with interest rate swaps. For interest rate swaps, counterparty default risk peaks at the middle of the swap's life, at which point we utilize credit derivative CQuntermeasures to offset the risk.
* Because currency swaps almost always include netting agreements and interest rate swaps can be structured to include mark-to-market agreements, we can significantly reduce the credit risk of these swap instruments by negotiating swap contracts that include these respective features. When negotiating these features is not possible, credit risk can be reduced by using off-market swaps that do not require an initial payment from IRI.
Six months have passed (180 days) since Torrey issued his report to IRI's management team, and the current exchange rate is now $0,085 per peso. The new term structure of interest rates is as follows:
Calculate the present value of the dollar fixed payments for the tw year currency swap six months after Torrey's initial analysis.
Rock Torrey, an analyst for International Retailers Incorporated (IRI), has been asked to evaluate the firm's swap transactions in general, as well as a 2-year fixed for fixed currency swap involving the U .S . dollar and the Mexican peso in particular. The dollar is Torrey's domestic currency, and the exchange rate as of June 1,2009, was $0.0893 per peso. The swap calls for annual payments and exchange of notional principal at the beginning and end of the swap term and has a notional principal of $100 million. The counterparty to the swap is GHS Bank, a large full-service bank in Mexico.
The current term structure of interest rates for both countries is given in the following table:
Torrey believes the swap will help his firm effectively mitigate its foreign currency exposure in Mexico, which sterns mainly from shopping centers in high-end resorts located along the eastern coastline. Having made this conclusion, Torrey begins writing his report for the management of IRI. In addition to the terms of the swap, Torrey includes the following information in the report:
* Implicit in the currency swap under consideration is a swap spread of 75 basis points over 2-year U .S . Treasury securities. This represents a 10 basis point narrowing of the spread as compared to this time last year. Thus, we can assume that the credit risk of the global credit market has decreased. Unfortunately, the decline provides no insight into the credit risk of the individual currency swap with GHS Bank, which could have increased.
* In order to decrease the counterparty default risk on the currency swap, we will need to utilize credit derivatives between the beginning and midpoint of the swap's life when this particular risk is at its highest. This is a significantly different strategy than we normally use with interest rate swaps. For interest rate swaps, counterparty default risk peaks at the middle of the swap's life, at which point we utilize credit derivative CQuntermeasures to offset the risk.
* Because currency swaps almost always include netting agreements and interest rate swaps can be structured to include mark-to-market agreements, we can significantly reduce the credit risk of these swap instruments by negotiating swap contracts that include these respective features. When negotiating these features is not possible, credit risk can be reduced by using off-market swaps that do not require an initial payment from IRI.
Six months have passed (180 days) since Torrey issued his report to IRI's management team, and the current exchange rate is now $0,085 per peso. The new term structure of interest rates is as follows:
Evaluate Torrey's statements regarding IRPs ability to mitigate the credit risk inherent in currency swaps and interest rate swaps. Torrey is only correct regarding:
Rock Torrey, an analyst for International Retailers Incorporated (IRI), has been asked to evaluate the firm's swap transactions in general, as well as a 2-year fixed for fixed currency swap involving the U .S . dollar and the Mexican peso in particular. The dollar is Torrey's domestic currency, and the exchange rate as of June 1,2009, was $0.0893 per peso. The swap calls for annua! payments and exchange of notional principal at the beginning and end of the swap term and has a notional principal of $100 million. The counterparty to the swap is GHS Bank, a large full-service bank in Mexico.
The current term structure of interest rates for both countries is given in the following table:
Torrey believes the swap will help his firm effectively mitigate its foreign currency exposure in Mexico, which sterns mainly from shopping centers in high-end resorts located along the eastern coastline. Having made this conclusion, Torrey begins writing his report for the management of IRI. In addition to the terms of the swap, Torrey includes the following information in the report:
* Implicit in the currency swap under consideration is a swap spread of 75 basis points over 2-year U .S . Treasury securities. This represents a 10 basis point narrowing of the spread as compared to this time last year. Thus, we can assume that the credit risk of the global credit market has decreased. Unfortunately, the decline provides no insight into the credit risk of the individual currency swap with GHS Bank, which could have increased.
* In order to decrease the counterparty default risk on the currency swap, we will need to utilize credit derivatives between the beginning and midpoint of the swap's life when this particular risk is at its highest. This is a significantly different strategy than we normally use with interest rate swaps. For interest rate swaps, counterparty default risk peaks at the middle of the swap's life, at which point we utilize credit derivative CQuntermeasures to offset the risk.
* Because currency swaps almost always include netting agreements and interest rate swaps can be structured to include mark-to-market agreements, we can significantly reduce the credit risk of these swap instruments by negotiating swap contracts that include these respective features. When negotiating these features is not possible, credit risk can be reduced by using off-market swaps that do not require an initial payment from IRI.
Six months have passed (180 days) since Torrey issued his report to IRI's management team, and the current exchange rate is now $0,085 per peso. The new term structure of interest rates is as follows:
Determine whether the excerpt from Torrey's report regarding the timing of peak credit risk is correct with regard to currency swaps and interest rate swaps.
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